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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Background: Symbolism vs. Connectionism
Connectionism is challenging "the central dogma of
Cognitive Science, that intelligence is the result of the
manipulation of structured symbolic expressions." (Newell,
1980, Pinker & Mehler, 1988) (henceforth, this so-called
central dogma is referred as "symbolism".) To advocates of
connectionism, one of the most important appeals of
connectionism, as indicated by its two other names "Parallel
Distributed Processing" and "Neural Networks", is its
biological plausibility, namely the massive parallel simple
processing units and the connections among them are highly
reminiscent of neurons and synapses in the brain. However,
to followers of symbolism, connectionism' s limits do not
stem from its parallel mechanism but the fact that it does
not process "symbols"
.
"The issue is not whether the mind is
a serial computer or a highly parallel one; it is whether
the mind processes symbols, whether it has rules and
representations." (Pylyshyn, 1984, p. 73)
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It is noteworthy that both symbolism and connectioni;
agree that representations are indispensable to the
explanation of cognition. (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, Gelder,
1990, Smolensky, 1987) The disagreement lies in the
conception of the nature of representations and the
mechanism processing representations. Symbolism argues that
mental representations are discrete content-blind symbols
and the mechanism of manipulating the symbols is governed by
mental rules. Connectionism, partially inspired by neurons'
activities which are analog in nature, (Anderson, 1983)
proposes that mental representations are similarity-based
and continuous in nature. Furthermore, to connectionism,
mental rules are at most convenient descriptions of the
knowledge a system has. (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) The
knowledge of a cognitive system is represented in the
connections among the widely distributed processing units.
(McClelland, Feldman, Adelson, Bower, and McDermott , 1986
,
cf. Fodor Sc Pylyshyn, 1988)
Human language, a paradigm case of a symbol -based
mental rule system (Marcus et al
. ,
1995, Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986) has become one of the most important
arenas of connectionism and symbolism. A classical example
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which supports the idea that human language is the product
of a mental rule system comes from the fact that English-
speaking children can add "-ed" to a novel verb, like
"gutch", to form past tense in experimental settings. They
can even produce "comed", "goed" etc. when they fail to
retrieve the correct irregular forms from memory. As Berko
(1958) said:" if a child knows that the plural of 'witch- is
•witches', he may simply have memorized the plural form. If
however, he tells us that the plural of 'gutch' is
'gutches', we have evidence that he actually knows, albeit
unconsciously, one of those rules which the descriptive
linguist, too, would set forth in his grammar."
Rumelhart & McClelland (1986) used a two-layer network
(henceforth RM model) to demonstrate that without explicit
representation of the "-ed" rule, the network can generalize
past tense forms of new verbs and the network's learning
process is similar to children's past-tense learning.
Particularly, the network, just like children, experiences
an overregularization stage. Two mechanisms employed by the
network are essential to its performance. First, all inputs
(verb stems) and outputs (past tense forms) are represented
as trigrams of phonetic features which define the similarity
space making similarity-based generalization possible. That
is, the trained RM model can generate past-tense forms of
new verbs on the basis of their feature overlaps with old
ones. Second, to trigger the overregularizat ion phenomenon,
the experimenter has to feed the RM model with a sudden
influx of regular verbs and their past tense forms during
the intermediate stage of training. However, the data
suggests that children's overregularization is not due to a
sudden influx of regular verbs in their input. (Marcus et
al., 1992, Pinker & Prince, 1988) The second mechanism is
simply based on a false assumption of child language
acquisition. The first mechanism is of particular interest
in this study, since the notion of feature-decompositional
representation is quite opposite to the symbol
-based
representation. "The hallmark of a symbol is that it can
represent an entire class of individuals suppressing the
distinctions among them." (Marcus et al
. ,
1995) In the case
of past tense, the "-ed" rule applies to all instances of
the symbol "verb", except for those irregular ones listed in
memory. The "-ed" rule does not pay attention to the
phonetic features of the instances of the symbol "verb"
.
Symbolic models commit to symbols which represent the
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"object qua object" and variables which represent task
relevant class of objects that "cut across feature
similarity" (Pinker & Prince, 1988), while the RM model
represents individual objects and variables as nothing but
clusters of activated features. This fundamental feature,
namely lacking symbols, is responsible for the following two
aspects of the RM model's performance. First, the RM model
does not generalize "-ed" properly to many new verbs;
second, the RM model is too powerful to be a model of human
learning. That is, it can extract some statistical
correlations among features that are not found in any human
language, such as "mirror-reversal of phonetic strings".
(Pinker & Prince, 1988)
Furthermore, Rumelhart & McClelland (1986) mistake the
notion of mental rule when they claim that the RM model's
uniform mapping can replace the mental rule. In the case of
English past tense, the regular form "-ed" is both
statistically dominant and a product of a mental rule.
However, a mental rule does not have to apply to the
statistically dominant case. Marcus et al . (1995) found that
German participle -t applies to a much smaller percentage of
verbs than its English counterpart, and the German plural -s
5
applies to a small minority of nouns, though both
-t and
-s
behave like their English counterparts as default mental
rules. This German case strongly challenges the assumption
behind the RM model, i.e., deriving lawful behavior by
picking up the dominant statistical correlations among the
features. To summarize, as far as the case of past tense is
concerned, the non-symbolic RM model based on a few false
assumptions of human language and language acquisition does
not make a strong empirical case against the symbolism
mental
-rule account.
Past tense morphology is only a tiny piece of the whole
rule system of language. The debate between connectionism
and symbolism continues in other domains of language as more
capable connectionism models are developed. One network
called "simple recurrent network" developed by Jeffrey Elman
(1990, 1991, 1993) is the focus of this research.
6
1.2 Introduction to Simple Recurrent Network
1.2.1 What Is Simple Recurrent Network
Many human behaviors (e.g. language, goal-directed
behavior and planning) express themselves as temporal
sequences. (Elman, 1990, Lashley, 1948, Servan-Schreiber
,
etal., 1988) Simple Recurrent Network (henceforth, SRN)
,
among other connectionism models is designed to process
sequential knowledge.
A prototypical SRN model consists of input units,
output units, hidden units and context units. See Figure
1.1. Context units are also "hidden" units in the sense that
they interact only with other nodes internal to the network.
It is using context units that makes the model a "recurrent"
network. Hidden units are activated by both input units and
context units; on the other hand, hidden units also feed
back to activate context units. In processing a sequential
input, at time t, hidden units are activated by input at
time t and their own activations at time t-1 which are
provided by the context units; in the mean time, hidden
units feed their activations at time t back to context units
7
which will return such activations to hidden units at time
t+I. The weights of connections between hidden units and
context units are fixed at l
. o and not subject to
20
10
output
t
60
10
t time t-1
time t
hidden
60
context
20 input
Figure 1.1 Architecture of Simple Recurrent Network
learning-based adjustment. In the learning phase, the output
is compared with a teacher input and the error as a result
8
of that comparison is used by the back-propagation algorithm
to adjust the connection weights incrementally.
1.2.2 The Performance of Elman's Simple Recurrent Network
In this research, the focus is Elman's SRN model (1990,
1991, 1993), which is the basis of his theoretical claims on
language acquisition as a statistics-driven process.
Basically, the learning capacity of Elman's SRN model
(henceforth, ESRN) is demonstrated by its performance in a
number of prediction tasks.
Elman (1990) shows that ESRN can predict one letter in
the sequence "diibaguuubadiidiiguuu
. .
.
" after being given
the previous letter. That is, after training, given "d" as
input, ESRN's output is "i" . Notice that the sequence is
semi -random; consonants occurred randomly, but following a
given consonant, the identity and number of following vowels
are regular. (The subsequences are "dii", "ba" and "guuu".)
Because of the randomness of consonants, errors in
predicting consonants are high, while errors tend to be low
in predicting vowels. After training with a more complicated
corpus which consists of 200 sentences of varying length (4-
9
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9 words, each word consists of letters), Elman (1990) al:
shows that ESRN can predict the next letter at each point in
time. Similar to the " consonant
-vowel task, at the onset of
each new word, the error is high; as more of the word is
received, the number of errors declines. As Elman said, "the
error provides a good clue as to what the recurring
sequences in the input are, and these correlate highly with
words." Furthermore, Elman argued that in the above
mentioned model, the notion of "word" was learned rather
than imposed in advance by the experimenter. Elman also
claimed that the network discovered word categories such as
Noun and Verb, and subcategories such as Transitive Verb and
Intransitive Verb.
To extend his idea, Elman (1991) constructs a semi-
artificial language to test ESRN. The sentences are formed
from a lexicon of 23 items including 9 nouns, 12 verbs, the
relative pronoun Who, and an end-of -sentence indicator (a
period)
.
The sentences have "agreement" (e.g. John feeds
dogs./ *Boys sees Mary. Note: signifies ungrammatical
sentences.) and "verb argument structure". The agreement and
verb argument structure become complicated in relative
clauses. Furthermore, because recursion is permitted, the
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agreement and verb-argument relation may be extended over a
considerable distance, such as "Boys [who girls (who dogs
chase) see] hear." After training the error of prediction
is 0.177. (Note: initial error is 12.45; the error is not
"mean squared error" since this is a non-deterministic
prediction task. Instead, Elman uses network's actual
outputs to compare against the likelihood of each target
word in every sentence, given the sentence context up to
that point.) Particularly, ESRN acquires the agreement, verb
argument structure and other properties. For example, given
"boy lives", ESRN predicts "end-of
-sentence" given "boy
sees", ESRN predicts "Singular Noun" and "Plural Noun".
(Since it has no way to tell exactly which one, singular
noun or plural noun will follow.) Furthermore, given "boys
who Mary chases", ESRN predicts "Plural Verb". That is,
despite the intervening relative clause, ESRN knows that
"boys" should agree with a plural verb. Supported by ESRN's
performances, Elman made a number of claims on language
acquisition in general.
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Elman's Claims Based on ESRN
1.3.1 Predict ion
Elman (1990) acknowledges that "While listeners are
clearly able to make predictions based upon partial input,
prediction is not the major goal of the language learner."
Elman (1991) takes a more aggressive position "Although
language processing obviously involves a great deal more
than prediction, prediction does seem to play a role in
processing. Listeners can indeed predict, and sequences of
words which violate expectations i.e., which are
unpredictable, result in distinctive electrical activity in
the brain"; "if we accept that prediction or anticipation
plays a role in language learning, then this provides a
partial solution to what has been called Baker's Paradox...
if we suppose that children make covert predictions about
the speech they will hear from others, then failed
predictions constitute an INDIRECT source of NEGATIVE
EVIDENCE which could be used to refine and retract the scope
of generalization." (emphasis added by this thesis) In
addition to this theoretical reason for using prediction
12
tasks, one technical reason might be that ESRN is good at
predicting sequence in general, (i.e. not only predicting
speech) and in ESRN the role of external teacher is
minimized, since the target outputs are supplied by the
environment at the next moment in time.
1.3.2 Representation
Representation is essential to ESRN for both
theoretical and technical reasons. In the semi-artificial
language task, each word is an orthogonal vector of all 0'
and a single 1. (e.g. "cat"--> 0001; "cats"--> 0010;
"dog"--> 0100; "chase"--> 1000) For n words, each vector
must be n bits long with one of them flipped on. To
symbolism, this representation is problematic in that no
morphology is represented, let alone word category
information. That is, the distance between "cat" and "cats
is same as the distance between "cat" and "dog". (Marcus,
1993) However, to Elman there are sufficient theoretical
justifications for using this representation paradigm. He
believes that it is dangerous to presuppose linguistic
representations such as "noun", "agent", even "word".
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(Recall how ESRN in Elman (1990) discovers the notion of
"word" from the input stream.) ESRN is preferred by Elman
not only because it is parsimonious in the sense that a
priori assumptions are limited to variables which are
"directly observable" in the environment, but also because
the network itself can show us what linguistic
representations are needed and how they are acquired by the
network. Elman is proud of the "fact" that given the
orthogonal representation telling nothing about word
category membership information, ESRN discovers word
categories (e.g. noun, verb) and subcategories (e.g.
animate/inanimate, human/ inhuman, etc.) by itself.
From the technical point of view, Elman prefers
distributed representation (at the hidden layer) to localist
representation because the former but not the latter can
provide large enough space to form "abstract representation"
and "structural knowledge" at the hidden layer which "tend
to be distributed across the high-dimensional (and
continuous) space." (Elman, 1991, p. 197) It is important to
note that Elman commits to the claim that ESRN acquires
"structural knowledge" through training; "structural '
knowledge" plays the causal role in ESRN, and such
14
"structural knowledge" is formed as "internal
representation" at the hidden layer.
1.3.3 Statistics, Structural Knowledge, Type/Token
Distinction
Statistical regularity is essential to any
connectionism model including ESRN. Elman is fully aware of
the classical argument made by Miller and Chomsky (1963)
that certain properties of natural language make
statistically based learning infeasible. To be immune to
such argument against statistical learning, Elman (1993)
draws a fine line between the use of statistics as the
"DRIVING FORCE" and statistics as the "OUTCOME" of learning,
(emphasis added by this thesis) Elman (1993) argues that
ESRN uses statistics as driving force to reach an outcome of
learning which can be characterized as a rule system rather
than a look-up table of statistics. Furthermore, Elman
(1993) argues that ESRN is able to "extrapolate beyond their
training data in ways which obviate the need, for example,
to see all possible combinations of words in sentences." To
summarize, it is argued by Elman that by taking advantage of
15
only co-occurrence statistics (i.e. without innate
structural knowledge or other helpful information) in the
training data, ESRN can successfully acquire the structural
knowledge which is supposed to be a hallmark of human
language
.
How can ESRN acquire structural knowledge? Elman's
explanation is as follows. For convenience, let's use
"context information" instead of "co-occurrence statistics".
Recall that "context units" are essential to Simple
Recurrent Network. Hidden units are always activated by both
input units and context units. That is, there are no
representations of "words in isolation"
. Each word is
represented along with its context. It is using context
information that makes ESRN acquire the structural
knowledge, as Elman believes. To illustrate, let's use
geometric terms. As mentioned above, the hidden units
activation pattern is represented in a high-dimensional
space. In such space, each word+context (again no word in
isolation) occupies its own specific position. Call each of
such word+context a "token". "Similar tokens" ("similar" is
defined by co-occurrence statistics.) are near to each other
in such space. A "type" may emerge out of such neighborhood
16
relationship among tokens. For example, "John" as a type
emerges out of many "John+context"
. Recursively, a bigger
type, say "noun" may emerge out of neighborhood relationship
among many "John", "Mary", "window" etc. A type is
represented as the mean vector of tokens. That is, such
space can be viewed as a tree with branches which in turn
have smaller branches. Elman argues that ESRN has not only
context
-insensitive types (something like symbols in
symbolism terms) but also context-sensitive tokens. Elman
(1991) also addresses the issue of the difference between
connectionism and symbolism in general. He argues that
connectionism "begins the task of abstraction at the other
end (i.e. token) of the continuum." (Elman, 1991, p. 221),
while symbolism comes from the type end; "...it is not
obvious what is meant by a rule. In the most general sense,
a rule is a mapping which takes an input and yields an
output .
"
To demonstrate the importance of context information to
the acquisition of structural knowledge, Elman (1990)
replaces the word man in the training data set with a new
word zog. (That is, the vector of zog is different from
those vectors the model is trained with.) A new set of 10000
17
sentences is created with such replacement wherever man
occurs. The new training set is presented to a trained
network (No new learning is allowed to occur.) Inspection
shows that "The internal representation for the word zog
bears the same relationship to the other words as does wan
in the original training set." (Elman, 1990, p. 201) That
is, zog is assigned nounhood among other structural
properties by the trained network. It strongly suggests that
ESRN really has structural knowledge, otherwise how can zog,
a new word "inherit" (i.e. without learning) such structural
properties from the network? For convenience, call this test
" zog test"
.
1.4 Human Subjects' Learning of Finite State Grammars
ESRN's learning of structural sequences is reminiscent
of human subjects' learning of artificial grammars. In the
late 1950s and early 1960s, inspired by Chomsky's decisive
critique of the behavioristic model of language acquisition,
some psychologists were interested in so called "implicit
learning" referring to the notion that children acquire the
grammar of their language in an implicit fashion (Chomsky,
18
1957, 1959) rather than establishing S-R associations by
explicit imitating. Using sentences (i.e. sequences of
letters) generated by a finite state grammar as stimuli,
Reber (1967) found that despite being uninformed of the
structural nature of the stimuli and in the setting of a
memorization task, subjects "learned to become increasively
sensitive to the grammatical nature of the stimuli."
Furthermore, based on what they learn from the mere exposure
of the stimuli, subjects can recognize grammatical sequences
which they had not seen during the learning session. This
entails an intriguing question: what is the nature of the
knowledge that subjects have as a result of such learning?
Reber (1989) addressed this question by using a knowledge
transfer paradigm which is used in this research.
In Reber (1989) , two finite state grammars (denoted X
and Y) were created and matched with each of two sets of
lexicons/letters (denoted 1 and 2)
,
creating four artificial
languages, L-Xl, L-X2, L-Yl, L-Y2
. See Figure 1.2. Note
that L-Xl shared exactly the same Syntactic Structure with
L-X2, so did L-Yl and L-Y2 . L-Xl and L-X2 used a different
explicit lexicon to construct sentences of each language, so
19
Figure 1.2 Two Finite State Grammars and Two Sets of Letters
sentences. In the second task, experimental groups were
defined by the nature of four transfer types: Lexicon-
20
Change, Syntax- Change, Both-Change and Null-Change. In the
second task, subjects were again asked to memorize the
training data. The prediction was that if subjects acquired
the abstract structural (syntactic) knowledge, then changing
lexicon would bring less detrimental effect on subjects'
performance than changing syntax would. However, if subjects
were learning to string together explicit lexicon, Lexicon-
Change condition would entail more detrimental effect on
their performance. Reber claimed that no a priori prediction
could be made for the Both-Change condition. Null-Change was
used as the control group. Testing results, as Reber (1989)
reported, suggested that "whenever the syntactic structure
of a language was changed on the transfer task, it had a
detrimental effect on subjects' behaviors, while a change in
the explicit lexicon had no noticeable effect." The
implication of this result was that what subjects acquired
was abstract structural knowledge and this knowledge could
be carried over to an appropriate new situation, such as the
situation in which the lexicon of the sentences but not the
syntax was changed. This carry-over effect is dubbed as
"Structural Knowledge Transfer Effect" in this thesis.
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To summarize, Reber (1967, 1989) showed that human
subjects can learn the syntax of a finite state grammar from
the mere exposure of the sentences generated by that
grammar; the syntax is represented as content-blind symbol-
based rules which subjects can mentally consult in order to
do recognition and reproduction tasks. In the finite state
grammar paradigm, the very content
-blindness of the symbolic
representation is reflected in the "Structural Knowledge
Transfer Effect".
1 . 5 Statement of The Problem
As mentioned above, Elman (1990, 1991, 1993) commits to
the following claims.
First, starting from non- structural representations and
using co-occurrence statistics as "driving force" of
learning, ESRN can acquire structural knowledge, such as the
syntax of a finite state grammar.
Second, the structural knowledge plays a causal role
underlying ESRN's prediction performance.
22
Third, as the Zog test indicated, though the word zog
was not in the training data set, a trained ESRN can assign
structural properties to this new word. That is, ESRN can go
beyond the mere statistical regularity of its training data.
Fourth, like all connectionism models, the knowledge of
ESRN is represented in the connections among the processing
units. It is noteworthy that the computer program of ESRN
has a special file storing the weights of the connections.
The program of ESRN allows loading this file of weights
(i.e. file of knowledge) to other networks.
The issue at stake is: can ESRN really go beyond the
co-occurrence statistics and acquire genuine structural
knowledge? The prediction is that a sufficiently trained
ESRN will have significant worse performance in the transfer
task, despite the fact that the syntax, but not the lexicon
on the transfer task was identical to that on the pre-
transfer task. Failing to transfer the knowledge ESRN gained
during pre-transfer task to transfer task in the Lexicon-
Change condition will undermine the claim that ESRN can
acquire genuine structural knowledge.
23
To test this prediction, a human subject experiment and
a computer simulation were conducted. Both experiments used
the knowledge transfer paradigm developed in Reber (1989)
.
The human subject experiment was a modified version of Reber
(1989) to confirm the existence of the Structural Knowledge
Transfer Effect in human subjects; the computer simulation
put ESRN in the knowledge-transfer paradigm.
24
CHAPTER 2
METHOD
2.1 Human Subject Experiment
2.1.1 Subjects
A group of 71 students (most of them were undergraduate
students taking Psychology courses in the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst.) participated this experiment.
Some subjects gave up during the experiment; some subjects
didn't finish the experiment due to technical problems, such
as failures of local area network. None of the incomplete
data was used. Eventually 48 subjects' data were used for
the analysis.
2.1.2 Design
The experiment consisted of two tasks. There was a
five-minute break between two tasks. In both tasks, subjects
were instructed to do a memorization task and no mention was
25
made of the grammar or the rule of the sentence generation.
The stimuli was referred as "letter sequences" rather than
"sentences". Task 1 was the pre-transfer stage in which
subjects did the original learning of the stimuli generated
by a finite state grammar. Task 2 was intended and designed
to be the knowledge transfer stage.
On task 1, all subjects were treated identically. They
were asked to try their best to memorize the letter
sequences presented on the computer. Subjects were asked to
do the same job on task 2. However, on task 2, the subjects
were divided into four experimental groups which were
Lexicon- Change Group, Syntax- Change Group, Null -Change Group
and Both-Change Group.
2.1.3 Stimuli
Four languages generated by two sets of letters and two
Finite State Grammars were used as stimuli. The first letter
set includes "V, S, P, T and X"; the second letter set
includes "F, J, U, M and N" . The two grammars (referred as
"New Grammar" and "Old Grammar" for convenience) were copied
from Reber's 1989 work. See Figure 1.2. That is, four
26
languages were referred as "New-l", ••New-2", "Old-l" and
"Old-2" respectively. For each language, 43 unique sentences
of length 3-8 letters consisted of the stimulus pool. Each
subject was randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental groups as above mentioned. For each subject on
each task, 18 sentences were selected at random from the
stimulus pool of a specific language. Since there were four
different languages, there were 16 possible "transfer
paradigms" which were further divided into the four
experimental groups in terms of the type of change: Lexicon-
Change, Syntax- Change, Null-Change and Both-Change. See
Table 2.1.
2.1.4 Procedure
All subjects filled the consent form (see Appendices A)
before they went to the lab. Each subject had a three-set
practice before real experiment. After the practice, the
subjects were left alone in the lab doing the tasks. The
computer gave the instruction before presenting stimuli. See
Appendices B for the instruction. For each subject on each
27
Table 2.1 Illustration of Subject Division
Task 1 Task 2 Experimental Group
New-1 New-1 Null
-Change
New
-2 New
-2 Null
-Change
Old-1 Old-1 Null-Change
01«^-2 Old-2 Null-Change
New-1 New- 2 Lexicon- Change
New
-2 New-1 Lexicon- Change
Old-1 Old-2 Lexicon- Change
Old-2 Old-1 Lexicon- Change
New-1 Old-1 Syntax- change
New- 2 Old-2 Syntax- change
Old-1 New-1 Syntax- change
Old-2 New- 2 Syntax-Change
New-1 Old-2 Both- Change
New-2 Old-1 Both-Change
Old-1 New-2 Both-Change
Old-2 New-1 Both-Change
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task, 18 sentences selected in the way as mentioned above
were divided into 9 sets of 2 sentences in each set. The
stimuli were presented by a Macintosh computer letter by
letter rather than sentence by sentence. That is, subjects
did not see a whole sentence, like MNF on the screen. What
they saw was that "M" stayed on the screen for 2 seconds
then disappeared; "N" showed up after the disappearance of
"M" and stayed for 2 seconds then disappeared, so and so
forth. At the beginning of each sentence, a "*" appeared as
a cue and after the last letter of each sentence, a "$"
appeared as the signal of ending a sentence. There were 3
seconds interval between two sentences. After each set of
two sentences was shown, the subject was asked to reproduce
the two sentences they just saw by typing their recall into
the computer. The computer informed the subject which
sentences were reproduced correctly and which were not . No
information was given about the nature of errors . The
subject's original performance were recorded into a separate
file. More importantly the computer recorded the number of
incorrect sentences reproduced by the subject for each set.
It was this "number of errors" for each set that was used as
the measurement of subjects' learning performance and was
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subject to statistical analysis. A set of sentences would
keep appearing on screen until the subject reproduced the
full set correctly. This procedure continued until all 9
sets were learned. This procedure was used in both tasks.
2.2 Computer Simulation with ESRN
2.2.1 Subjects
A ESRN- template was created. It had 10 input units, 10
output units, 40 hidden units, 40 context units. Based on
this template, 10 nets were created as the equivalent of 10
human subjects in order to have a more reliable data based
on the average of 10 nets' performance. Since the localist
representation was used in the input and output level and
each letter can be represented by any one of the 10 units,
10 nets were only different from each other in terms of the
10-unit representation code of the five letters. See Table
2.2 for the illustration.
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e 2.2 Ten Representation Codes for Ten Nets
Net 1J- Net 2 Net 3 Net 4 Net 5
T
:
1 n n nU nu U AU 0 0 0 P X V s
nu nu U u U 0 0 0 0 T P X V
V 0 n IX nVJ u U Au A(J Au 0 S T P X
X : 0\j n n TX u Au Au AU Au 0 V S T P
p •tr . u U nU U 1 0 0 0 0 0 X V S T
b Net 7 Net 8 Net 9 Net 10
T • u u U AU U -11 U 0 0 0 P X V S
c .o . 0 U u nU Au 1 AU Au A0 T P X V
V: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 S T P X
X: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 V S T p
P: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 X V S T
2.2.2 Design
The simulation also consisted of two tasks. The first
task was the pre-transfer stage and the second task was
intended and designed to be the knowledge transfer stage. In
the first task, each ESRN net was trained with sentences
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generated by a finite state grammar. (In fact, the stimuli
used for the simulation were exactly the stimuli used by one
of the human subjects. See Appendices C.) In the second
task, each trained net was exposed to a new set of training
data. The new training data in task 2 was generated by the
same finite state grammar as that of task 1. The only
difference between training data of task l and task 2 was a
vector- representational one. That is, for example,
1000000000 in task 1 was changed into 0000010000 in task 2 ;
0100000000 in task 1 was changed into 0000001000 in task 2.
Changing vector- representational corresponds to changing
letters from P, V, T, S and X to M, N, F, J and U or vice
versa in human subject case.
2.2.3 Stimuli
The training data was a copy of the stimuli used by one
of the human subjects on task 1. Each letter of the
sentences was translated into a 10-bit vector with one bit
flipped on. There were 10 vector-representation codes as
listed in Table 2.2. The testing sentence "TPPTXVPS" was not
in the training data.
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2.2.4 Procedure
On task 1, each net was trained up to 100,000 sweeps.
Each sweep was an exposure of a letter. During the training,
a built-in mechanism saved the network's weights status into
separate files every 4,000 sweeps. After the training, each
net was tested by asking it to predict each letter of the
testing sentence. A program was used to check out how many
correct predictions were made by each net. Two indices were
used to measure the nets' prediction performance. The
primary index was the number of correct predictions made by
the nets; the secondary index was the average Luce ratio.
The Luce ratio was used as a measurement when the net made
the same amount of correct predictions with different amount
of training, which actually was a commonplace in this
simulation. The Luce ratio is "the ratio of the highest
activation on the output layer to the sum of all activations
on that layer." (Servan-Schreiber , et al .
,
1988) The Luce
ratio suggested how confident the net's predictions were. In
fact, the Luce ratio is a more sensitive function of the
training experience in terms of sweeps. Different nets
reached their best performance with various amount of
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training in terms of sweeps, in task 2, the trained net
loaded with the weights file which resulted in its best
performance in task 1 was trained another 100,000 sweeps
with a new set of training data. During the training of task
2, the built-in mechanism also saved weights status into
separate files every 4,000 sweeps. Because of the separate
weights files, the testing was performed in the following
way. For example, to find out ESRN's prediction performance
with 24,000-sweep training experience, the weights file of
24,000-sweep training experience was loaded into the to-be-
tested net, then the net was tested with the testing
sequence
.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
3.1 Human Subject Experiment
3.1.1 Dependent Measures
The "number of errors" in reproduction for each set of
stimuli was used as the dependent measure in human subj ect
experiment
.
See Table 3
.
1 for the illustration of now cne
errors were counted
.
Table 3 .
1
Illustration of How to Count Subjects ' Errors
Set Presented Recalled # of Errors
1 TTV; TTP PTV; TTP 1
1 TTV; TTP TW; TPPP 2
1 TTV; TTP TTV; TTP 0
2 WPP; PTV WPP; PTV 0
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For the hypothetical case in the Table 3.1, 3 errors were
counted for the first set and 0 error was counted for the
second set respectively. Figure 3.1 shows the mean number of
errors per set for all experimental groups across the 18
sets of the experiment. Table 3.2 shows the mean number of
errors for each group on each of two tasks.
Table 3.2 Breakdown Means of 9
-Set Data
^^°^P Task 1 Task 2 Difference
Lexicon-Change 2 ,.48 1
.
. 69 0 . 79
Syntax- Change 3 ,.51 3 .. 12 0 . 39
Null -Change 3 ,.59 2 .07 1
,
.52
Both- Change 2 .92 2 .32 0 ,.60
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LEXICON-CHANGE
NULL-CHANGE
BOTH-CHANGE
Figure 3.1 Mean Errors on Each of The 18 Sets
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3.1.2 Analysis
Three blocks of analysis were conducted. Each block of
analysis included ANOVA of data of both tasks, ANOVA of task
1, ANOVA of task 2 and comparisons of experimental groups on
task 2
.
The first block of analysis used each subject's 9-set
performance on both tasks. A three-way ANOVA examining
Task (1/2)
,
Group (Lexicon-Change/Syntax-Change/Null-
Change/Both- Change) and Set (1 through 9) with Task and Set
as within subject factors was conducted.
Three significant effects were found: Task, F(l,
44)=17.955, p<.000; Set, F(8, 352)=5.574, p<.000; Task *
Set, F{8, 352)=3.498, p<.001. It is noteworthy that the Task
* Group interaction effect was not significant F(3,
44) =2.413, p<.079. A significant Task * Group interaction
effect as reported in Reber (1969) is crucial in confirming
the prediction of this study. This critical unexpected
effect will be addressed later in this Chapter. A separate
two-way ANOVA of data from task 1 showed that the only
significant effect was Set, F(8, 352)=7.043, p<.000. The
lack of Group effect was as expected, since all groups were
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supposed to be treated identically on Task 1. The
significant Set effect suggested a learning trend in thi,
stage which was also as expected. A separate two-way ANOVA
of data from task 2 showed that the only significant effect
was Group effect, F(3, 44)=2.815, p<.05. This Group effect,
as expected, suggested that four groups of subjects, though
performed identically on task 1, performed differently on
task 2 because of different experimental conditions
involved
.
To find out the way in which the four groups were
different from each other, more comparisons between groups
were conducted. A two-way ANOVA of the data from Lexicon-
Change and Null -Change group on task 2 found neither
significant Group effect, F<1, nor other significant
effects. A two-way ANOVA of the data from Syntax-Change and
Both-Change Group on task 2 did not find any significant
effects either. Based on this result, the data from Syntax-
Change and Both-Change group were collapsed together, so
were the data from Lexicon- Change and Null -Change Group. A
two-way ANOVA of this two-group collapsed data found a
significant Group effect, F(l, 46) =4.905, p<.032 and that
was the only significant effect. These results were also
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reported by Reber (1969). Based on those results, Reber
(1969) claimed that "whenever the syntax was changed on task
2 (i.e. in the transfer stage), it had a
-detrimental
effect' on subjects' performance, while a change in the
lexicon of the language had no noticeable effect." However,
results of this study did not support such a clear-cut
conclusion. Two more comparisons were conducted. A two-way
ANOVA of the data from Lexicon- Change and Syntax- Change
group revealed a significant Group effect, F(l, 22) =6.722,
p<.017, just as expected.
However there were three non- significant comparisons
which were not as expected. First, a two-way ANOVA of the
data from Lexicon- Change and Both- Change group found no
significant Group effect, F(l, 22) =1.44, p<0.243; second, no
significant difference between Syntax-Change and Null -Change
group, F(l, 22) =3.693, p<0.068; third, there was no
significant difference between Null -Change and Both- Change
group
.
Finally, as expected, there was no significant
difference between the group collapsing Lexicon-Change and
Both- Change together and the group collapsing Syntax- Change
and Null -Change together. Therefore, in total only two
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significant comparisons were found. One was between Lexic(
Change and Syntax-Change group; the other was between the
group collapsing Lexicon- Change and Null-Change together and
the group collapsing Syntax-Change and Both-Change together.
More comments on this result will be given in Chapter 4.
The first block of analysis yielded one crucial result,
i.e., the lack of Task * Group effect which made the claim
of "Structural Knowledge Transfer Effect" dubious. The
second series of analysis, a more powerful analysis was
carried out based on the assumption that if there was a
knowledge transfer whatsoever, it should have occurred
between the end of task 1 and the beginning of task 2 . As
Reber (1969, P. 118) commented "... discussions of negative
and positive transfer refer to performance on the initial
sets of task 2 relative to the asymptote achieved during
task 1 .
"
The second block of analysis used only the last 4 -set
data of task 1 and the first 4-set data from task 2. See
Table 3.3 for the breakdown means. A three-way ANOVA of the
data from both task 1 and task 2 revealed only one
significant effect: Task * Group, F(3, 44) =3.809, p<.016.
The non- significant Set effect was in keeping with the
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assumption that subjects' performance achieved asymptote
during the end of task 1. a separate two-way ANOVA using 4-
set data from task l found no significant effect, exactly as
Table 3.3 Breakdown Means of 4
-Set Data
^^°^P Task 1 Task 2 Difference
Lexicon- Change 1.688 1.896 -0.21
Syntax- Change 2.5 3.94 -1.44
Null-Change 2.96 1.75 1.21
Both-Change 2.35 2.44 -0.09
expected. A separate two-way ANOVA using 4 -set data from
task 2 found a significant Group effect, F(3, 44) =4.468,
p<.008. As in the first block of analysis, more comparisons
among the experimental groups were conducted. No significant
difference between Lexicon- Change and Null-Change and
between Syntax-Change and Both-Change Group was found. The
difference between the group collapsing Lexicon- Change and
Null -Change and the group collapsing Syntax-Change and Both-
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Change was again significant, F(l, 46)=7.804, p<.008. The
difference between Lexicon-Change and Syntax-Change group
was significant, F(l, 22)=9.314, p<.006. In contrary to the
expectation, no significant difference between Lexicon-
Change and Both-Change or between Null-Change and Both-
Change was found. However, contrary to the result in the
first block of analysis, the difference between Syntax-
Change and Null-Change group was significant, F{1, 22)=
9.304, p<.006.
Obviously, there were some agreements and disagreements
between the results of the analysis based on 9 sets and the
analysis based on 4 sets. Before giving a complete list of
those agreements and disagreements, the third block of
analysis is reported below.
Both 9 -set and 4 -set analysis had the same result that
the difference between the group collapsing Lexicon- Change
and Null -Change and the group collapsing Syntax-Change and
Both-Change Group was significant. The third series of
analysis used the collapsed data and it was still concerned
about the Task * Group Effect. A three-way ANOVA using 9-set
data found: Task, F(l, 46) =17.636, p<.000. Task * Group,
F(l, 46)=4.33, p<.043, Set, F(8, 368)=5.558, p<.000. Task*
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Set, F(8, 368)=3.46, p<.001. As expected, a separate two-way
ANOVA of task 1 found no significant Group effect but a
significant Set effect, F(8, 368)=7.107, P<.000. A separate
two-way ANOVA of task 2 found a significant Group effect, as
reported in the first and second block of analysis, F (i,
46) =4.905, p<.032. A three-way ANOVA using 4-set (collapsed)
data found the only significant effect was Task * Group,
F (1, 46) =4 . 735, p<.035. As expected a separate two-way ANOVA
of task 1 found neither a significant Group effect, nor
other significant effects. A separate two-way ANOVA of task
2 found a significant Group effect, as reported in the
second block of analysis, F (1, 46) =7 . 804, p<.008.
It seems that the results based on the data of two
collapsed groups and 4 sets for each task are most
consistent with the predictions of this study and Reber's
(1969) reports. That is, subjects can transfer the abstract
syntactic knowledge in the appropriate new situation.
However, this claim was cast doubts by a few critical
unexpected effects which will be addressed in next Chapter.
As promised earlier, Table 3.4 and 3.5 list the
agreements and disagreements between 9 -set analysis and 4
set analysis; between four-group analysis and two-group
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e 3.4 Comparing Results of ANOVAs
Four Groups Two Groups
9 Sets 4 Sets 9 Sets 4 Sets
£• i. J.CO U o R H H R H H
i d.SrC * * not N/A ** not
Cot- * ** not N/A ** not
iasK i^roup not N/A * *
iaSK * bGt not * * not N/A ** not
uveraii (^roup not not not N/A not not
iasK-1 Group not not not not not not
Task- 2 Group * * ** * * * *
Task-1 Set * * * not N/A ** not
Task-2 Set not not not not * not
Note: "R" stands for Reber (1969); "H" stands for this
thesis; "*" stands for "p<.05"; stands for "p<.01".
"not" stands for non-significant
.
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analysis, and between data in this study and Reber's data i
1969
.
Table 3.5 Comparisons Between Groups on Task 2
Comparisons 9 Sets 4 Sets
K TTH H
L vs N not not not
S vs B not not not
L&N vs S&B * * * *
L vs S * * * *
L vs B * not no
S vs N * not * *
L&B vs S&N N/A not N/A
N vs B * not "not
Note: "L" stands for Lexicon- change ; "S" stands for Syntax-
Change; "N" stands for Null -Change; "B" stands for Both-
Change
.
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3.2 Computer Simulation with ESRN
3.2.1 Dependent Measures
The ESRN's prediction performance is illustrated as
follows
.
correct: 1000000000
ESRN: 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
A program idealized the ESRN's prediction as the following.
ESRN: 0000100000
That is, the program took the maximum activation as 1 and
other activations as 0
.
In this example case, the network's
prediction was wrong. The correct prediction was referred as
"hit". It is noteworthy that this treatment is in favor of
the ESRN. Based on such idealization, the program yielded
the "number of hits" for each testing. The number of hits
ranged from 0 to 8, since the testing sentence had 8
letters. For each task, averaging the "number of hits" for
each testing over 10 nets yielded "mean hits" . See Figure
3.2 for the data. The nets made more correct predictions on
task 1 than on task 2. The mean difference was 0.554. A
paired t-test revealed that the difference was significant.
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^ Task1
Task2
Linear (Task 1
)
Linear (Task2)
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
SETS (1SET=4,000 Sweeps)
Figure 3.2 Mean Hits of the First 12 Sets for Both Tasks
t (25) =9.222, p<.000. This result was clearly in favor of the
prediction made in Chapter 1. The nets' performance on task
2 showed no positive transfer of knowledge whatsoever
despite they were loaded with the weights files as results
of learning on task 1. The Elman's claim that ESRN can
acquire structural knowledge as humans do was seriously
undermined by this result.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
4.1 Comparing Human Subject Experiment with Reber's 1969
Study
First of all, it is noteworthy that the human subject
experiment was a modified version of Reber (1969) in which
subjects saw stimuli sentence by sentence rather than letter
by letter as what I did in this study. The reason for this
modification was that this study was trying to have a fair
comparison between human subjects and ESRN, since a
reasonable intuition is that being exposed to the whole
sentence might facilitate human subjects to acquire
structural knowledge while ESRN can only see the stimuli
letter by letter. Furthermore, being fed only one unit of a
sequence at a specific time was one of the important
features of ESRN, so it was inappropriate to change ESRN's
capacity in this regard. One more measure for having a fair
comparison between human subjects and ESRN might be asking
subjects to predict a new sentence letter by letter after
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learning, just like what ESRN did in testing, if this
prediction rather than reproduction paradigm had been used,
subjects had to be instructed explicitly to learn a grammar
rather than to be instructed to do a memorization task. That
is, there would be no "implicit learning" any more. However,
previous researches done by Reber (1967, 1989) showed that
subjects failed to learn the grammar if they were instructed
explicitly to do so. For this concern, the reproduction
paradigm was used. A few more differences between human
subject experiment in this study and Reber 's are as follows.
First, Reber (1969) presented the stimuli with 5*8 inch
index card; while this study used computer presentation.
Second, Reber (1969) used three sentences in each set with 6
sets on each task, while in this study, in order to
compensate the difficulty posed by the letter-by-letter
presentation paradigm, each set included only two sentences
with 9 sets on each task. Third, Reber (1969) used 64
subjects with 16 in each group, while this study used 48
subjects with 12 in each group.
Secondly, it is remarkable that despite so many
differences between Reber' s 1969 study and this 1996 study
in terms of implementation the experiment, there were still
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overwhelming agreements in their findings. From Table 3.2
and Table 3.3, we can see that eleven out of sixteen
reported significant and non-significant effects of any
theoretical interests in Reber's study were agreed by 9-set
analysis in this study; another eleven out sixteen reported
significant and non- significant effects of interests in
Reber (1969) were also agreed by 4-set analysis in this
study; two inconsistent effects were as expected, since in
some aspects there should be differences between using 4
sets and 9 sets. For example, there was a significant Set
effect on task 1 in Reber's report; however we should not
expect such Set effect in the last 4 sets, which was exactly
what was found in the 4-set analysis. Once again, this
result suggested that 4-set analysis had a more consistent
account of the data. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity
to see how many effects in this study were agreed by Reber's
study, since this study did much more tests than Reber
reported
.
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4.2 How to Interpret Structural Knowledge Transfer Effect
Presumably, the Structural Knowledge Transfer Effect
that this study was looking for is that the knowledge
subjects learned from task l is abstract in nature, so that
on task 2 they can use that abstract knowledge to improve
their performance (in terms of making fewer errors)
, if the
Syntax is not changed from that on task 1. This prediction
implies that on task 2 there should be a significant
difference between Lexicon- Change and Syntax
- Change ; between
Syntax- change and Null -Change; between the group collapsing
Lexicon- change and Null -Change and the group collapsing
Syntax-change and Both-Change. All these three crucial
predictions were confirmed by the 4-set analysis. However,
two other intuitive implications by the Structural Knowledge
Transfer Effect, a significant difference between Null-
Change and Both- change ; between Lexicon-Change and Both-
Change were not confirmed in either 9 -set or 4-set analysis.
These two out-of -expectation non- significant
differences may have three possible interpretations. First,
the ''structural knowledge transfer effect" claimed by
Reber(1969) is simply not fully confirmed by this study.
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-ve
second, because both out-of
-expectation findings invor
Both-Change group, while on the other hand many other
findings agree with Reber(l969), it is likely that Both-
Change group had produced extreme values or other
experimental errors. Third, the effect of changing both
lexicon and syntax may be more complicated than a mere
linear sum of the effect of changing lexicon and the effect
of changing syntax. Reber(1969) had a similar out-of
-
expectation finding in this regard. He found that "There is
a (non- significant) tendency for Both-Change group to make
fewer errors than Syntax- Change group hinting that changing
the syntax while using the same letters produces more
interference than changing both." In fact, Reber (1969)
made it clear that "It is difficult to establish a priori
whether this (referring to Both-Change) should be a
negative, neutral, or a positive transfer paradigm." In any
event, it should be acknowledged here that the data of this
study did not fully support the claim of "structural
Knowledge Transfer Effect"
.
Another perspective of interpreting Structural
Knowledge Transfer Effect is concerned when the transfer
occurs. Presumably subjects acquired the syntax at the later
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stage of task l instead of the beginning stage. If there was
a knowledge transfer whatsoever (structural or non-
structural; positive or negative) the most obvious transfer
effect should be seen at the beginning stage of task 2,
though it may last to the end of task 2 . This idea was
confirmed by the fact that a significant Task * Group effect
was not found in 9-set analysis but in 4-set analysis.
4.3 ESRN's Performance
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the nets' prediction
performance was sampled every 4000 sweeps from total 100,000
sweeps on each task. There were nine possible values of the
number of hits (0--8)
.
The nets reached their best
performance with various amount of training. See Table 4.1
below
.
It was crucial to find out the very best performance
and load the weights file underling that performance to
begin task 2
. It was often the case that the number of hits
remained unchanged after a lot of training was done while
the Luce ratio changed along with the increase of the
training experience. Therefore, the Luce ratio was used to
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make a fine differentiation among the nets' performance
levels
.
Table 4.1 Training Amount for the Best Performance
Net
Task
Highest
1
# of Sweeps
Task
Highest
_
2
# of Sweeps
1 7 (3 .32) 68, 000 5 (2 21) 36, 000
2 6 (2 .93) 100, 000 8 (3 71) 64, 000
3 6 (2 . 78) 72, 000 8 (2 94) 20, 000
4 6 (3 .04) 92, 000 1 (0 . 64) 4, 000
5 7 (3 .18) 48, 000 6 (2 .57) 32, 000
6 6 (2 . 60) 36, 000 6 (2 .52) 36, 000
7 6 (2 .77) 44, 000 6 (2 .66) 48, 000
8 8 (3 . 07) 16, 000 7 (2 . 62) 24, 000
9 6 (2 .57) 28, 000 6 (3 .07) 88, 000
10 6 (1 .79) 8, 000 5 (2 . 71) 100, 000
Note: In the column under "Highest", the numbers on the left
refer to "number of hits" ; the numbers on the right refer to
Luce ratio.
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It is noteworthy that 100,000 sweeps may seem
excessive. There were two reasons for using so large amount
of training sweeps. First, the number of sweeps heavily
depended on arbitrary parameters such as the net's "learning
rate" and "momentum". In this case, learning rate was 0.02
and momentum was 0.08. Both were very low. Second, using a
large number of sweeps could make sure that the potential
best performance was reached.
4.4 Conclusion: Implications for Language Acquisition
The structural property of linguistic knowledge
(Chomsky, 1986, Cook, 1988, Haegeman, 1991, Pinker, 1995) is
one of the most important empirical discoveries for the
study of language in modern times. Linguistic rules are
structure-dependent. The building blocks of sentences are
nouns, verbs, clauses etc., but not words. Consequently, one
important question for the students of language acquisition
is where those word categories come from. Many linguists ,
psychologists and other cognitive scientists believe that
certain categories are innate. However, based on ESRN, Elman
(1990, 1991, 1993) argued that those word categories (even
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the very notion of word) are learnable through unstructured
experience (e.g. speech stream represented as binary vectors
in ESRN)
,
therefore there is no need to ascribe those word
categories to be innate. Obviously, whether Elman's argument
is convincing or not depends upon if ESRN can go beyond the
co-occurrence statistics of the training data and acquire
the genuine structural knowledge. What this study tried to
demonstrate was that in the same knowledge-transfer
paradigm, human subjects can transfer the abstract syntactic
knowledge to an appropriate new situation in which the
lexicon but not the syntax was changed from the previous
training/ while ESRN with sufficient experience had to start
from scratch to learn a new language despite the syntax was
still the one used in the previous training data. The
empirical finding of this study, though not exactly as
predicted, did undermine Elman's claim of ESRN' learning
capacity. In order to make a stronger case showing that
ESRN cannot go beyond co-occurrence statistics and acquire
abstract structural knowledge, future study should further
explore the Structural Knowledge Transfer Effect both in
human and computer simulation in detail. Specifically, in
human case, the question whether Both-Change group is
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different from Lexicon-Change group or Null-Change Group
must be resolved; in simulation case, ESRN should be exposed
to other conditions, namely Both-Change, Null
-Change and
Syntax-Change. In addition, the method of measuring ESRN'
s
performance should also be modified.
In this study, only the most active unit in the 10
-unit
output layer was taken as the prediction and compared with
the testing sequence which the net had never seen. This
measurement may underestimate the nets' knowledge of the
syntax, if any. It is noteworthy that at each node of the
finite state grammar(see Figure 1.2), there are two possible
pathes to follow for producing the next letter. This is like
in natural language, both "noun-verb-noun" and "noun-verb-
verb" may be grammatical
.
The experimenter can arbitrarily
choose the probability of each path in generating the next
letter. In this study, each path was given 50% opportunity
in generating the next letter. Thus, a network even with
perfect understanding of the syntax underlying the stimuli
still cannot predict the next letter with absolute
certainty. Therefore, taking only the most active unit as
the nets' prediction is not fair to the nets. Instead, both
the most active and the second most active should be taken
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as predictions and compared with two possible letters
dictated by the syntax. Table 4.2 illustrates with a
8-letter testing sequence, how the nets can be scored.
One caveat is that though linguistic knowledge is
structural in nature, it is not true that linguistic
knowledge is the only structural knowledge human mind has.
One implication of this caveat is that human subjects may
not use the same mechanism in learning the artificial
language used in this study as that they use in acquiring
their first language in childhood. However, this study is
empirically sufficient and logically sound to cast
significant doubts on Elman's argument that ESRN acquires
structural knowledge by being exposed to unstructured
stimuli and the mechanism used by ESRN in learning the
finite state grammar is essentially what children use in
language acquisition.
Connectionism, especially its underlying technology, is
a new approach to the understanding of cognition. However,
neither the idea that the mechanism of mind is essentially
associations of mental units nor the objection to the very
idea of association is new. In 1948, K. S. Lashley made some
comments on various serial behaviors including language.
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Table 4.2 A Modified Measurement of Nets' Performance
Target PAT ma 2ndMA Score
#5 #1 #4 #1 1
#5 #1 #1 #1 1
#1 #5 #1 #1 1
#4 #2 #4 #3 1
#3 #4 #3 #4 2
#5 #2 #5 #2 2
#2 #2 #5 #1 0
#1 #3 #3 #5 1
total : 9
Note: The numbers under "Target" refer to the units that
flip on in the 10 -unit vector. For example, #5 means that
the fifth unit should be flipped on, i.e., "00001000". "PAT"
refers to "possible alternative target" . "MA" refers to
"most active"
.
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"It has been found in studies of memorization ofnonsense syllables that each syllable found in the serieshas associations, not only with adjacent words in theserres, but also with more remote words. The words in thesentence have, of course, associations with more remote
sucfdirect " ' ^'^^ con^inat ^n of
structure
^'^^ account for grammatical
it is certain that any theory of grammaticalform which ascribes it to direct associative linkage of hewords of the sentence overlooks the essential structure of
speech. The individual items of the temporal series do notm themselves have a temporal
-valance' in their associative
connections with other elements. The order is imposed by
some other agent .
"
This comment was made in the Hixon Symposium on
Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior. And it was later cited and
recommended in Chomsky's landmark critique of Behavioristic
account of language-
-Review of B.F. Skinner, Verbal
Behavior. (Chomsky, 1959) It may be fair to say that ESRN is
merely a modern incarnation of the associationism that
Lashley denounced half a century ago.
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APPENDIX A
HUMAN SUBJECT CONSENT FORM
I understand that I will participate in a research
project on human memory.
I understand that I will be presented with English
letter sequences as stimuli. The experiment will consist of
two sessions. Each session is worth 1.5 credits. My memory
performance, but not my name will be recorded.
I understand that I am free to discontinue
participation at any time and still receive credit. I agree
to participate in this project.
Subject's Signature:
Date of Experiment
:
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APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTION TO HUMAN SUBJECTS
This is a memory test. The experiment will consist of
two sessions with a 5
-minute break between them, in each
session you will be presented 9 sets of letter-sequences;
each set has two letter-sequences. Each letter sequence will
be presented letter by letter. There will be a two- second
pause between letters. Each letter sequence will be preceded
by a and the end of a sequence will be indicated by a
.
After each set is presented, you will be asked to
reproduce the two sequences in the order shown. Only after
you have reproduced a set correctly, will you be allowed to
go on. Good luck and get ready!
Press the "G" key for go and type "return" when you are
ready.
63
APPENDIX C
THE TRAINING DATA FOR THE NETWORKS
TTS, TTXVPS, VXXXXXVS, TPTXVS
, TPPPTXVS
,
TPPPPPTS, VXVPXVPS
,
VXVPS, VXXXXVPS, TPTS, WPXVS
,
WPXXVPS, TPPTS, TTXVPXVS
,
TPPTXXVS, VXVS, VXVPXXVS, TTXXXVPS
.
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